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regulation.  The program was a great success by almost all measures.  This paper, which draws upon a re-
search workshop and a policy roundtable held at Harvard in May 2011, investigates critically the design, 
enactment, implementation, performance, and implications of this path-breaking application of economic 
thinking to environmental regulation.  Ironically, cap and trade seems especially well suited to addressing 
the problem of climate change, in that emitted greenhouse gases are evenly distributed throughout the 
world’s atmosphere.  Recent hostility toward cap and trade in debates about U.S. climate legislation may 
reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more than the substantive merits of market-
based regulation.
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Preface
In 2009, the U.S. Congress considered but ultimately failed to enact legislation aimed at limiting 
U.S. greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions.1  Over several months of often contentious debate, millions of 
Americans were introduced to the phrase “cap and trade,” a regulatory approach that first came to promi-
nence in the 1990s as the centerpiece of a national program to address the threat of acid rain by limiting 
emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2), primarily from electric power plants.
The 1990 SO2 cap-and-trade program was conceived by the administration of President George H. 
W. Bush and was widely viewed as a success.  Yet cap and trade became a lightning rod for congressional 
opposition to climate legislation from 2009 through 2010.  Some of that hostility reflected skepticism 
about whether climate change was real and, if it was, whether humans played a key role in causing it. 
A larger group of opponents in Congress worried about the proper role of government and the costs of 
combating climate change, particularly given the lack of commitments for action by the large emerging 
economies of China, India, Brazil, Korea, South Africa, and Mexico.  The congressional debate touched 
only lightly on the relative merits of various policy options to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Thus, cap 
and trade may not have been defeated on its merits (or demerits), but rather as collateral damage in the 
larger climate policy wars. 
Congress (to the extent it did assess policy alternatives to cap and trade), as well as the broader 
community of analysts and observers in the late 2000s, raised a number of substantive questions about the 
merits of this policy instrument as a means for responding to a major environmental policy challenge of 
the sort posed by climate change (Peace and Stavins 2010):
•	 Cap and trade is part of a larger class of policy approaches to alleviating pollution and managing natural 
resources that rely on market mechanisms.2 How do the costs of such a market-based approach com-
pare with traditional regulatory policies to reduce pollution?
•	 Can market-based policies—and the markets they create—be trusted to reduce emissions? That is, are 
they environmentally effective?
1   The bill under consideration at that time, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, was the last in a series considered over several years.   
Sponsored by Representatives Henry Waxman (D-California) and Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts), the bill passed the U.S. House of Representa-
tives but failed to win sufficient support in the Senate.  No legislation was enacted, and by 2010, both Congress and the White House had aban-
doned efforts to pass federal climate legislation. For text of and information on the bill and its legislative context, see: www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.
xpd?bill=h111-2454.
2   The principal market-based alternative to cap and trade is a tax on emissions (see text box). For a comprehensive discussion of market-based environmen-
tal policy, see Stavins (2003).2 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
•	 What are the distributional impacts of market-based environmental policies; who are the winners and 
losers?
•	 How well does a cap-and-trade system stimulate technological innovation, as compared with an en-
vironmental policy that sets performance standards, specifies technologies for reducing pollution, or 
both?
In May 2011, the Harvard Environmental Economics Program hosted a two-day research work-
shop and policy roundtable in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to reflect on these and other questions in light 
of twenty years of experience implementing the SO2 cap-and-trade program, established under Title IV 
of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990.3 Also known as the Acid Rain Program and the SO2 
allowance-trading system, Title IV represented the first large-scale application of cap and trade to control 
pollution—in the United States or any other country.4 
This policy brief synthesizes the main conclusions and insights that emerged from the May 2011 
workshop and roundtable, which included economists and legal experts who had conducted extensive 
research on the SO2 allowance-trading system, as well as leaders of non-governmental organizations and 
former government officials who had guided the formulation and passage of the CAAA.5  Participants 
discussed the SO2 cap-and-trade program’s design, implementation, performance, and legacy—and its 
implications for the issues that emerged in recent congressional debates about U.S. climate policy.  This 
policy brief draws on their analysis and on supplementary evidence.6
We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of participants in the research workshop and policy 
roundtable, as well as the comments and edits some provided on an earlier draft of this brief. Their ex-
pertise and experience made the project possible. (Comments made by participants in the workshop were 
not intended for attribution, and specific insights are not referenced in the brief. For a list of participants, 
see inside the back cover.)  We also thank Marika Tatsutani, who edited the brief and provided valuable 
substantive insights, and Bryan Galcik, who designed and produced the document.  Finally, we are grateful 
to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, which provided generous support for the workshop and for the prepara-
tion of this study.
3   For the text of the amendments and other information see www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp.
4   The largest emissions trading program in the world is now the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), a greenhouse-gas, cap-and-trade 
system that was implemented in 2005 and whose design was influenced by the U.S. SO2 program.
5   See the list of participants inside the back cover.
6   For background on and analysis of the SO2 allowance-trading program, see generally Ellerman, et al. (2000) and Stavins (1998).HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM  •  HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL  »  3
The SO2 Allowance Trading System and the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990:
Reflections on Twenty Years of Policy Innovation
Gabriel Chan, Robert Stavins, Robert Stowe, and Richard Sweeney7
Harvard Kennedy School
1. Introduction
In 1990, the U.S. Congress passed and President George H.W. Bush signed into law amendments 
to the Clean Air Act, which included a path-breaking, market-based approach to addressing the threat of 
acid rain. The SO2 allowance-trading program established under the 1990 Amendments was the world’s 
first large-scale pollutant cap-and-trade system.  This policy brief examines the design, enactment, imple-
mentation, and performance of that system, with an eye toward identifying lessons learned for future ef-
forts to apply cap and trade to other environmental challenges, including global climate change.  The first 
section provides background on the Acid Rain Program and summarizes data and analysis on its benefits. 
Subsequent sections examine key questions regarding cost, environmental effectiveness, market perfor-
mance, distributional implications, and effects on technology innovation.  We then examine the political 
context of the formulation, enactment, and implementation of the SO2 allowance-trading system.  Finally, 
in the conclusion, we briefly reflect on implications for climate change policy.
2. The Acid Rain Program: Background and Benefits
By the late 1980s, there was growing concern that acid rain was damaging aquatic ecosystems, 
forests, and buildings in the northeastern United States and southeastern Canada. Acid rain is the result of 
SO2 and, to a lesser extent, nitrogen oxides (NOx) reacting in the atmosphere to form sulfuric and nitric 
acids, which are deposited on the Earth’s surface through either precipitation or dry processes. Flue gas 
emissions from coal-fired, electric-power plants were (and remain) the primary source of SO2 emissions 
and a major source of NOx emissions in the United States.
The stated purpose of Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990 was to reduce 
total annual SO2 emissions in the United States by ten million tons relative to 1980, when total U.S. emis-
7   Chan and Sweeney are Ph.D. students in Public Policy; Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; and Stowe is the Executive 
Director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program.4 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
sions were about 25.9 million tons.8 The program mandated an allowance-trading system9 and specified 
that this goal would be accomplished in two phases. Phase I (1995–1999) required significant emissions 
reductions from the 263 most polluting coal-fired electric generating units, almost all located east of the 
Mississippi River.10 Phase II, which began in 2000, placed an aggregate national emissions cap of 8.95 
million tons per year on approximately 3,200 electric generating units—nearly the entire fleet of coal-fired 
plants in the continental United States (Ellerman et al. 2000, 6–7; NAPAP 2005, 6–7). This cap—affect-
ing almost exclusively the power sector—represented an approximately 50 percent reduction from 1980 
levels, when power-sector emissions were about 17.5 million tons.
The SO2 allowance-trading program had a number of features that would subsequently become 
common to virtually all cap-and-trade systems. (See box on cap and trade.) At the beginning of the pro-
gram, the government (freely) allocated allowances, denominated in tons of SO2 emissions, to power 
plants covered by the law, according to formulas contained in the legislation and elaborated upon by 
regulation. If annual emissions at a regulated facility exceeded the allowances allocated to that facility, the 
facility owner could either buy allowances or reduce emissions, whether by installing pollution controls, 
changing the mix of fuels used to operate the facility, or by scaling back operations.  If emissions at a regu-
lated facility were reduced below its allowance allocation, the facility owner could sell the extra allowances 
or bank them for future use; these opportunities created incentives to find ways to reduce emissions at the 
lowest cost.
By contrast, most air pollution regulations prior to the 1990 CAAA took a much more prescrip-
tive approach, either by setting uniform emission limits on classes of emitters or by specifying the type of 
pollution-control equipment to be installed. Such requirements are relatively inflexible, imposing the same 
abatement path upon a range of heterogeneous facilities and ignoring the fact that the costs of compliance 
might vary widely across individual facilities depending on the age, technology characteristics, operating 
conditions, and quality of fuel used. This type of inflexible environmental regulation came to be known by 
the somewhat pejorative term “command-and-control,” invoking visions of Soviet-style planning.
The environmental objective of the Acid Rain Program was to reduce emissions of SO2 and NOx, 
but its effectiveness in achieving these objectives should be distinguished from the benefits of the program 
8   The legislation itself did not specify a target year. For SO2 emissions data, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Emissions Inventory 
Air Pollutant Emissions Trends Data; “1970–2011 Average annual emissions, all criteria pollutants in MS Excel – October 2011,” tab “SO2.” For 
power-plant emissions, see line “FUEL COMB. ELEC. UTIL.” www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/index.html.
9   We use the phrases “allowance trading” and “cap and trade” interchangeably. The CAAA also mandated a smaller quantity of power-sector NOx reduc-
tions, but the NOx program did not allow for allowance trading and is not addressed in this brief.
10   A number of additional units that were to be regulated only in Phase II opted-in early for Phase I.HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM  •  HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL  »  5
(intended or not). The intended benefits of the program were associated with reduced acidification of 
aquatic ecosystems, primarily in the Northeast. However, subsequent assessments of the program found 
that by far the greatest benefits were in the form of avoided health damages from reduced levels of airborne 
fine particles derived from SO2 emissions.11 Estimates of these health benefits vary widely, but they appear 
to be on the order of $50 billion per year by 2010.  This compares with estimated program costs (see be-
low) on the order of $0.5 billion (Burtraw 1998; NAPAP 2005, 64; Shadbegian, Gray, and Morgan 2005; 
U.S. EPA, Office of Air and Radiation 2011).12
3. Cost
A key question concerns cost—specifically, how the costs of achieving environmental objectives 
through cap and trade compare with those of a “counterfactual” (hypothetical alternative) command-and-
control regulatory approach.  Indeed, policy makers asked this question during discussions in the late 
1980s about a new program for SO2 emissions reduction. They proceeded on the basis of projections13 and 
economic theory suggesting that cap and trade would be much less costly, relative to traditional, prescrip-
tive regulatory approaches.14
Extensive analysis has demonstrated over the subsequent twenty years that these projections were 
largely correct.  A summary of economic research addressing this question and presented in the workshop 
identified a range of 15–90 percent savings, compared to counterfactual policies that specified the means 
of regulation in various ways and for various portions of the program’s regulatory period.15 
In addition to being less costly than traditional command-and-control policies would have been, 
the program’s costs were significantly below estimates generated by government and industry analysts in 
the debate leading up to the passage of the CAAA. In 1990, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
11   Though the program’s SO2-emissions-reductions targets were achieved, and there has been an observed, significant reduction in acid precipitation in the 
Northeast, it takes much longer to reverse the acidification of ecosystems, which is the environmental harm that inspired the legislation in the first place 
(NAPAP 2005, 58–64). However, health benefits will dominate ecological benefits regardless of the time required for ecosystem recovery.
12   Attempts to quantify the benefits of the Acid Rain Program have generally not included all improvements to ecosystems, both because these are much 
more difficult to estimate and because they are much smaller than human health benefits—by at least an order of magnitude. See especially Burtraw 
(1998). More than a decade after passage of the CAAA, Banzhaf, et al. (2006) found that the benefits of ecosystem recovery in the Adirondacks justified 
the costs of the acid rain program, notwithstanding the substantially greater public health benefits. For a detailed analysis of costs and health benefits 
associated with recent policies intended to replace the SO2 allowance-trading system, see Schmalensee and Stavins (2011).
13   These projections were largely the result of modeling conducted by ICF, a consulting firm retained by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. See, 
e.g., references in Burtraw and Palmer (2003).
14   Costs referenced in this section include those to industry for complying with the program and to government for administering the program.
15   See, among others, Carlson, et al. (2000); Ellerman, et al. (2000, 253–295); Keohane (2003).What is cap and trade?
T
he fundamental motivation for any government policy to reduce emissions is that pollution im-
poses costs on society (related to health and environmental quality) that are not borne by polluters—
“external costs.” These costs to society must be “internalized” or made the responsibility of the polluter, if 
the polluter is to have an incentive to abate.  A cost-effective system of regulation would be one in which 
the costs incurred are minimized, relative to other systems of regulation with commensurate environmental 
results.
Several basic features are common to all cap-and-trade programs.  First, government decides on the total 
(aggregate) quantity of emissions to be allowed under the program for a stated time period (usually per 
year)—that is, the “cap.”  Next, government creates allowances (or “permits”), denominated in quantities of 
the pollutant in question.  The total number of allowances issued is equal to the cap.
At the start of the program, allowances may be given to the entities subject to the program (firms, facilities) 
for free or sold for a price (usually through an auction)—or some combination.  A regulated entity must 
hold and surrender to the government at the end of each compliance period allowances equivalent to that 
entity’s actual emissions during the period.  If a firm does not hold sufficient allowances, it is subject to pen-
alties or other enforcement actions.  In the case of the SO2 program, these penalties were, for the first time, 
specified in the statute, set at levels significantly higher than the anticipated compliance costs, and imposed 
automatically, thus providing certainty with regard to consequences for noncompliance.
Firms may buy allowances on the market to meet their compliance obligations, or they may choose to 
reduce their emissions. For companies holding too few allowances, the choice to abate or buy allowances 
would depend on the cost of compliance versus the price (or anticipated price) of purchasing allowances.*1  
Because each individual company (or facility) has the flexibility to choose the course of action that costs it 
the least to achieve compliance, investment in abatement technology or procedures would flow to where 
it was least costly to reduce emissions. (The marginal cost of abatement becomes equalized across all enti-
ties.)  In aggregate, the mandated environmental target is achieved at lowest cost; this is why cap and trade 
is generally considered a cost-effective form of regulation.
*   Covered entities that hold too many allowances would make precisely the same calculation about whether to abate; if the cost of abatement (per ton) is 
lower than the price of allowances, the firm with a surplus will abate and have more allowances to sell on the market (for a higher price than it costs to 
abate).HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM  •  HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL  »  7
(EPA) estimated the cost of implementing the Acid Rain Program (with allowance trading) at $6.1 bil-
lion.  In 1998, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), an industry organization, and Resources for 
the Future (RFF), an independent think tank, estimated that total implementation costs would be $1.7 
and $1.1 billion respectively (based in part on actual figures for the first few years of the program; NAPAP 
[2005, 13]). (See Figure 1.)
Several factors explain the large decline in the cost estimates.  Power-plant operators in the eastern 
states benefited from increased access to—and falling prices of—low-sulfur coal from the Powder River 
Basin (PRB) in Wyoming and Montana, due to the deregulation of the railroads in the 1980s, which 
reduced transportation costs (Ellerman et al. 2000, 82–89).  For many facilities this made fuel switching 
less expensive than installing scrubbers.16  (The primary technology for reducing SO2 emissions is flue-gas 
desulfurization, and equipment employing this technology is commonly known as a “scrubber.” Scrubbers 
16   Of the 263 Phase I units, 136 (52 percent) pursued fuel switching or blending. These units accounted for 59 percent of Phase I emissions reductions; 
scrubbers were installed at 27 (10 percent) of the units, accounting for 28 percent of the emissions reduction (Lange and Bellas 2005, 547).
Figure 18 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
remove SO2 from a boiler’s flue gas stream before the gas enters the atmosphere.) At the same time, coal-
mine operators elsewhere in the country responded to PRB competition and changing fuel demands by ex-
ploiting medium-sulfur coal seams. Coal from these seams would produce emissions just above the limit of 
1.2 pounds of SO2 per millon BTUs17 set by the Clean Air Act of 1970 for new plants, but not enough in 
excess of that limit to be worth scrubbing. Finally, technological innovation in both scrubbers and power 
plants (some of it prompted by the trading program itself, as discussed below) reduced costs over this time 
period, primarily through better management of the fuel mix. Taken together, these developments made 
it possible for electric utilities to achieve greater SO2 reductions through fuel switching, relative to more 
expensive investments in new equipment.18
While the costs of the SO2 allowance-trading system were low, other evidence suggests that they 
were not as low as they could have been, in the sense that they did not achieve the theoretical least-cost 
abatement solution for a cap-and-trade system. One study suggests that costs remained $280 million (51 
percent) and $339 million (59 percent) higher than the least-cost solution in 1995 and 1996, respectively 
(Carlson et al. 2000, 1295–1296, 1318). Factors that kept costs above the theoretical minimum19 were, 
first, provisions in the CAAA that encouraged early scrubbing to limit impacts on high-sulfur coal produc-
ers, and second, lack of information about marginal abatement costs and other crucial factors on the part 
of market participants.  In the early years, power-plant operators may have lacked the information (and as-
sociated experience and confidence) to take full advantage of the flexibility that the SO2 allowance-trading 
system offered. Third, in the early years of the program, utilities were subject to economic regulation at the 
state level that had the effect of distorting or constraining their responses to market-based federal environ-
mental regulation (Arimura 2002; Bohi and Burtraw 1992). Some faced uncertainty over whether state 
regulators would approve the inclusion of costs incurred to purchase emissions allowances, in those states 
that allowed costs to be recovered from electric ratepayers.  Similarly, there were interactions between the 
SO2 system and other federal regulations, such as New Source Review and New Source Performance Stan-
dards, which may have created inefficiencies in how the program operated.  Finally, there was considerable 
policy uncertainty, particularly in Phase II, when regulators and policy makers were considering further 
reductions in the national SO2 cap, as is discussed below.
17   British Thermal Units—a measure of the quantity of heat.
18   Some analysts have suggested that because the reduction in fuel costs would have occurred anyway—and would have reduced the costs of a command-
and-control SO2 program as well—then the cost savings attributed to the SO2 allowance-trading program (relative to a command-and-control system) 
should be adjusted downward (Carlson et al. 2000, 1314).  However, a prescriptive regulatory approach (such as a policy that required the installation 
of scrubbers at all power plants) might have prevented utilities from taking advantage of these alternative compliance options.
19   That marginal abatement costs still varied across facilities, even after the SO2 cap-and-trade system was implemented, is evidence that the cap-and-
trade system did not always yield cost-effective mitigation outcomes; some utilities ended up paying more on a dollar-per-ton basis to comply with the 
program than others. Analysts disagree, though, on the significance of these variations, largely depending on whether they are compared with much 
larger heterogeneity in abatement costs prior to the SO2 allowance trading system or with the ideal convergence of marginal costs in a cost-minimizing 
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In sum, the SO2 allowance-trading system’s actual costs, even if they exceeded the cost-effective 
ideal for a cap-and-trade system, were much lower than would have been incurred with a comparable 
traditional regulatory approach, and were much lower than the trading system’s predicted costs.  There 
is broad agreement that the SO2 allowance-trading system provided a compelling demonstration of the 
cost advantages of a market-based approach. It is important to elaborate on this conclusion, however, by 
examining two ancillary issues that have significant  cost implications: uncertainty and the problems of 
combining policy approaches.
Cost-Uncertainty and Cap and Trade
Firms desire certainty (low variance) in regulatory requirements and compliance costs, the latter 
being facilitated by flexibility in the means to comply.  A regulatory instrument that offers a predictable 
compliance regime and greater cost certainty20 will usually enable companies to take advantage of longer-
term investments that may reduce costs over time.  Cost certainty is especially important for the electric 
power industry, whose capital assets (physical facilities) are long-lived.
Compared with an emissions tax (see box) or technology-standards-based, command-and-control-
style regulations, a cap-and-trade system offers individual firms less certainty about abatement costs, be-
cause the price of allowances fluctuates with market conditions.  Firms that make incorrect predictions 
about allowance prices (or, alternatively, marginal abatement costs) are less likely than competitors with 
better foresight to select an optimal compliance strategy.  However, ancillary policy-design elements of the 
SO2 allowance-trading system mitigated this uncertainty. Banking provisions gave firms the flexibility to 
save (“bank”) allowances from one compliance period for use in a future compliance period, thus effec-
tively smoothing price fluctuations (Burtraw and Mansur 1999).  Another program feature that required 
EPA to auction small percentages of the total allowance pool “facilitated both the price discovery process 
and the development of the allowance market” (Schmalensee et al. 1998, 66).  This allowed firms to fore-
cast allowance prices more accurately.
The difficulty of predicting program costs and benefits suggests that it may have been desirable 
to build more capacity for adaptation into the SO2 system—including with regard to the cap.  Instead of 
legislating a fixed cap on emissions in years well beyond the planning horizon of decision makers at the 
beginning of the program, the 1990 Amendments could have given EPA authority to adjust the SO2 cap in 
future years as the science evolved and as better information on real-world control costs became available.   
Alternatively, the 1990 Amendments could have implemented a rule-based adjustment process that might 
20   Or at least, in the case of regulated electric utilities, greater ability to recover costs through rate increases.10 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
have been easier for firms to anticipate. For example, Burtraw, Palmer, and Kahn (2010) discuss the role of 
a reserve price in the revenue-neutral auction that, if triggered, could have tightened the cap automatically 
when abatement costs turned out to be lower than expected.
Tension exists between providing regulatory certainty over long periods of time (which is desirable 
from the standpoint of reducing costs) and allowing for flexibility to adjust program goals (which may be 
desirable from the standpoint of maximizing net program benefits over time).21   In striking that balance, 
the 1990 Amendments may have leaned too heavily towards providing certainty at the cost of allowing 
for flexibility to adjust the policy as understanding of both science and markets improved.  This prefer-
ence undoubtedly also reflected a certain amount of distrust of the EPA on the part of Congress, with a 
corresponding unwillingness to cede to EPA the right to set program requirements in the future without 
congressional input and approval. The inability of the Acid Rain Program to adjust ultimately led to its 
demise, as is discussed below.
Exclusion of Command-and-Control Add-Ons
An important feature of the SO2 allowance-trading program was what was not included in the 
program.  Despite widespread skepticism about the cost and environmental effectiveness of a cap-and-
trade system, the 1990 CAAA largely avoided imposing supplementary mandates for SO2 abatement, 
whether through specific pollution control technology requirements or performance standards for indi-
vidual plants.22 This enabled the system to capture the efficiency gains of allowing flexibility in the methods 
of abatement used by different firms and making it possible for firms with high abatement costs to trade 
with firms that faced low abatement costs.
When the SO2 allowance-trading program was introduced, power plants around the country had 
widely different emissions profiles.  Older coal-fired plants in the East tended to have high SO2 emissions, 
while the relatively newer power plants in the West and Southwest generally had much lower emissions—
21   As one workshop participant noted, resetting the SO2 cap would have also required future adjustments to the allocation of free allowances under the 
cap.  This would have been politically contentious and could have created an additional source of uncertainty for affected firms. This problem could be 
alleviated in the future by defining free allocations as a percentage of the cap rather than as a specific number of tons.  This practice is routine in fisheries 
management, which utilizes similar mechanisms known as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Over the past fifteen years, proportional adjustments 
to the 1990 allocations have been proposed in unpassed legislation (Acid Deposition Control Act, 1997 [U.S. EPA, Office of Air and Radiation 2000], 
and Clear Skies Act, 2002 [www.epa.gov/clearskies]) and in finalized regulations (Clean Air Interstate Rule [2005; www.epa.gov/cair] and Cross-State 
Air Pollution Rule [CSAPR, 2011; www.epa.gov/airtransport]).  The latter rules resulted in a significant reduction in SO2 emissions (beyond Title IV); 
their impact on allowance prices was complex and is discussed below.
22   More recently, however, new regulations, especially CAIR and CSAPR (see note above), have contained plant-level requirements that have sharply 
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in part because they were built after the introduction of stringent EPA standards regulating newly-con-
structed facilities (New Source Performance Standards), and because they burned primarily lower sulfur 
coal from mines in the West.
Largely because of this heterogeneity, had the 1990 CAAA included a technology (most likely 
scrubber) mandate, aggregate compliance costs would have been much greater.  Technology mandates 
would also have constituted an obstacle to firms reducing emissions further than was either required by 
regulation or was otherwise financially reasonable.23 Absent a requirement to invest in a specific manner to 
comply with a technology mandate, plant operators who discovered new, cost-effective abatement oppor-
tunities had an incentive to implement them so that they could bank or sell the excess allowances (which 
were then worth more than the avoided emissions as a result of taking advantage of these new opportuni-
ties). There is significant evidence of such “over-compliance” under the SO2 allowance-trading program (as 
discussed in a later section on the effectiveness of the program’s banking provisions).
4. Environmental Effectiveness
Environmental effectiveness refers to the degree to which a policy achieves its objective.  In the case 
of a cap-and-trade program, the question is whether emissions are kept at (or below) the cap. Can cap-and-
trade systems (compared with command-and-control regulation) be relied on to produce desired levels of 
emissions reductions?  If the answer were no, cap and trade would probably be a poor policy choice regard-
less of its cost advantages.
In exploring this question, it is important to make a distinction, relevant to all environmental 
policy, between the stringency or ambition of the program—that is, whether the goal set for emission 
reductions is adequate to address the public health or environmental damages that have been identified—
and the effectiveness of the policy in achieving whatever goal is set (that is, whether targeted reductions 
are, in fact, realized).  Deciding the stringency of the program—that is, setting the level of the cap—is the 
first critical step in designing a cap-and-trade system. 
Setting the Level of the Cap
The efficient level of pollution abatement occurs when the cost of reducing emissions by one ad-
ditional unit equals the benefit to society of an additional unit of pollution reduction. In practice, it is 
23   A number of Senators from eastern states that produced high-sulfur coal did insert a provision into the CAAA to award bonus allowances to plant opera-
tors who installed scrubbers. These states had an interest in promoting greater reliance on scrubbers, since this abatement option—in contrast to fuel-
switching options—allowed for the continued use of the high-sulfur coal that was mined in their states (Ellerman et al. 2000, 59, 69–70). The provision 
was of sufficiently small scope that it did not significantly affect the cost effectiveness of the system.Taxes vs. Cap and Trade 
E
mission taxes are a market-based alternative to cap and trade (Metcalf, 2007): Like cap and trade, they 
create a price signal that provides incentives for emissions reductions while leaving individual firms the 
flexibility to pursue whatever abatement strategy is least costly for them.  Emission taxes have some poten-
tially important advantages over cap and trade: First, they do not require the government to track or allocate 
allowances and thereby avoid questions about how to allocate allowances in the first place.  (Calculating 
tax charges does require monitoring of actual emissions, just as determining compliance with an allowance-
trading system would.)  Second, taxes provide price certainty—once government sets the tax rate, everyone 
knows exactly what the cost per ton will be for as long as the tax is in place (Weitzman 1974).  Third, taxes 
avoid concerns about distortion, manipulation, or excessive price volatility in allowance markets. Finally, in 
countries that may not have a well-developed institutional infrastructure to support commodity markets, 
taxes may be a more feasible option, administratively.
Taxes also have disadvantages. Of particular concern to environmental advocates is that a tax does not guar-
antee specific quantities of emissions reduction.  Annual emissions-reductions will fluctuate, depending on 
the cost and availability of abatement options (which cannot be precisely known in advance) relative to the 
level of the tax.  Second, taxes often raise distributional concerns (e.g., the concern that emission taxes are 
regressive or might fall more heavily on some groups than others), although it is the case that any regulatory 
policy creates winners and losers.  (See below for more on distributional issues.)
Third, while concerns about market complexities and failures arise with cap and trade, a tax is subject 
to becoming increasingly complex, to being changed in the future, and to having revenues redirected to 
other purposes as exemptions, deductions, loopholes, and subsidies are introduced through the interplay 
of interest-based politics and the legislative process. The most complex aspects of a cap-and-trade system  
usually involve the distribution of free allowances, but these allocation decisions have no effect on the cost-
effectiveness of the system (to a close approximation, but see Stavins [1995]).  In tax legislation, by contrast, 
complexity arises when tax preferences of various sorts are granted to favored interests.  Such preferences do 
adversely affect the cost-effectiveness of the system.  In particular, when lower tax rates or exemptions are 
granted to some parties or interests, the same quantity of emissions will have multiple prices.  This detracts 
from the cost effectiveness of the policy.  A cap-and-trade system, on the other hand, preserves a single price 
per unit of emissions, even when relief is granted to favored interests through free allocation.
Finally, and perhaps decisively, taxes are extremely unpopular.  Taxes make the costs of abating emissions 
highly visible, whereas in an allowance-trading system, these costs are less obvious. Having said this, given 
the extreme fiscal pressures sure to be faced by the U.S. government over coming years and the unpopularity 
of cap and trade in recent climate debates, it is possible that a carbon tax, in some form, will be among the 
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usually difficult to determine the efficient level of abatement, both because it is difficult to assess the mar-
ginal cost of abatement in advance and because it is difficult to quantify, in monetary terms, the environ-
mental or public health benefit that would result from an additional ton of emissions reduction.  Partly 
because of this uncertainty, political negotiations over program stringency tend to focus on identifying a 
level of perceived benefits for which costs are acceptable, rather than employing formal benefit-cost analy-
sis to find the level of action at which the difference between benefits and costs is greatest (Arrow et al. 
1996).  This was the case both for the Title IV program and in more recent climate proposals.
The explicit and implicit analysis carried out by the George H.W. Bush Administration in the 
context of the 1990 CAAA focused almost exclusively on the cost side.  The benefits considered were those 
associated with reducing the ecological impacts of acid rain.  Not surprisingly, analysts failed to foresee 
either lower-than-expected abatement costs or the substantial human health benefits of reducing fine par-
ticulate pollution, which also originates from SO2 emissions. Had those lower costs and added benefits 
been fully appreciated, policy makers might have pursued an even lower SO2 cap. According to workshop 
participants, formal analysis was neither fully ignored by nor fully incorporated into the decision-making 
process; rather it was overwhelmed by heuristic (“back of the envelope”) sketches of real and perceived 
costs—to industry, electricity ratepayers, and the economy as a whole—and of potential environmental 
effectiveness.24
That the SO2 emissions cap was not determined by formal benefit-cost analysis, but instead reflect-
ed a qualitative collective judgment about what constitutes an acceptable balance of cost and environmen-
tal protection, does not make the decision about the cap any less important to the design or effectiveness 
of the cap-and-trade program.  On the contrary, the level of the cap in the SO2 allowance-trading system 
was very important for political and economic reasons and of great concern to electric utilities.  As one 
workshop participant put it: “Above all, what stands out for me in the policy lessons about acid rain is that 
the cap is the essential driver. And the best role of government is to have government deciding how much 
environmental protection it’s going to afford and…give the market the flexibility and entrepreneurs the 
flexibility to figure out how to deliver that in the least expensive way.” This view of the central rationale 
for a cap-and-trade system can be traced to an idea articulated by Baumol and Oates (1971):  If it is too 
difficult to determine what level of pollution control is perfectly efficient in every instance (in the sense 
that the marginal costs incurred to provide that level of control are exactly offset by the marginal benefits), 
then government can simply set an acceptable standard and focus on minimizing the costs of achieving it   
(and perhaps iterating through subsequent adjustments).
24   Benefit-cost analysis has developed very considerably since 1990 and is now more regularly and systematically deployed in meaningful ways to inform 
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Given that decisions about major new environmental policies are—to some degree—determined 
by political leaders’ evaluations of how both costs and environmental effectiveness will be perceived by 
stakeholders, a cap-and-trade system offered promise on both fronts. Cap and trade can reduce costs, and 
it offers a clear and stable environmental target—the emissions cap. The challenge remained, in the case of 
acid rain, to convince stakeholders that the cap was low enough.25  By reducing the costs of regulation rela-
tive to conventional prescriptive approaches, cap and trade made it politically feasible to reduce emissions 
more than might otherwise have been the case.  Without the cap-and-trade architecture, it is unlikely that 
a ten million ton reduction would have been endorsed by the Bush Administration or would have had the 
votes to pass the Congress.  
Apparently, the one type of formal economic analysis that White House policy makers did consider 
was the so-called “knee” or “elbow” of the cost curve analysis—that is, identifying the level of pollution 
control at which the marginal cost of abatement began to increase sharply. Again, there was considerable 
uncertainty, but it appeared that the knee was in the range of a seven to eight million ton reduction over 
the approximate time period envisioned for the program. Adopting cap and trade would move the knee 
up (enabling larger emissions reductions before marginal costs rose sharply), but workshop participants 
agreed that no one knew by how much. The Bush team eventually chose a ten million ton reduction policy, 
which was the most ambitious of the three options presented to the President by the Domestic Policy 
Council at the time, according to workshop participants. (The other options proposed targeted reductions 
of six and eight million tons.)26  This ten-million-ton option presented marketing opportunities: It was a 
double-digit number, and it represented a 50 percent reduction in emissions, both of which signified that 
Bush was serious about pollution reductions.
Effectiveness in Achieving the Cap
The SO2 allowance-trading program was highly effective.  SO2 emissions from electric power plants 
decreased 36 percent (from 15.9 million to 10.2 million tons) between 1990 and 2004,27 despite the fact 
that electricity generation from coal-fired power plants increased 25 percent over the same period (growing 
25   And that the market for allowances would work, but for that see below.
26   It also represented the greatest reduction of the more than 70 legislative proposals offered in the preceding ten years and was consistent with reductions 
advocated by Canada and the environmental community.  For example, a bill sponsored by Senator George Mitchell (D-Maine) called for a twelve mil-
lion ton reduction from projected 2000 emissions, which was consistent with a ten million ton reduction off actual 1980 levels as contained in President 
Bush’s proposal and the enacted legislation (Jackson 1987; Joskow and Schmalensee 1998, 48).
27   U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Emissions Inventory Air Pollutant Emissions Trends Data; “1970–2011 Average annual emissions, all 
criteria pollutants in MS Excel—October 2011,” tab “SO2,” line “FUEL COMB. ELEC. UTIL.”. www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/trends/index.html.HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM  •  HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL  »  15
from 1.59 to 1.98 billion megawatt hours).28 The program’s long-term goal of reducing annual nationwide 
utility emissions to 8.95 million tons was achieved in 2007; by 2010 emissions had declined further, to 5.1 
million tons, in response to the related Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), which was promulgated in 2005 
under the George W. Bush Administration. (CAIR is discussed further in a later section.)29
The SO2 allowance-trading program delivered emissions reductions more quickly than expected.   
Because of its banking provisions, many utility companies—some of which owned plants that were very 
dirty and had large and relatively inexpensive abatement opportunities—over-complied in the first phase 
of the program.  As a result, actual emissions during Phase I of the program (1995–1999) fell well below 
the Phase I target.  One workshop participant remarked that the Phase I reduction in emissions was “the 
most striking feature of [the acid rain] program … There has never, in the history of 40 years of clean air 
regulation, been a comparable, quick, and significant reduction of emissions at one time.” Again, utilities 
were not compelled to over-comply in the early years of the program; rather, incentives internal to the 
program led to the decisions that produced these large, early reductions.  On the other hand, in the early 
years of Phase II (2000–2010), national emissions exceeded the national cap as firms applied excess allow-
ances banked during Phase I. 
Effective monitoring and compliance mechanisms played a major role in the SO2 allowance-trad-
ing system’s environmental effectiveness, in the view of both environmental advocates and industry stake-
holders. One participant noted that while he initially opposed the requirement that regulated units install 
costly, real-time, continuous emissions monitors, he later came to view this requirement as central to the 
legitimacy of the program.
Although the specific cap was identified and set in a somewhat ad hoc manner, the SO2 allowance-
trading system is widely viewed as having been highly effective. The program achieved its emission-reduc-
tion goals with relatively little government intervention (of the traditional type) and with very high levels 
of compliance among regulated entities (compared with significantly lower levels of compliance for most 
previous traditional regulatory policies).  These results were achieved despite considerable concern that the 
SO2 allowance market would fail to function properly—a topic to which we now turn.
28   U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Electricity Net Generation: Total (All Sectors), 1949–2010,” http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/data/an-
nual/txt/ptb0802a.html.
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5. Market Performance and Regulatory Complexity
Because a cap-and-trade system for emissions had never been implemented on a large scale prior 
to 1990, considerable concern arose during the CAAA debate about how well the SO2 allowance market 
would work in practice.  One potential problem was that the market would have too few buyers and sellers 
of allowances—insufficient liquidity—to function well.  In that case, utilities needing allowances to com-
ply might not be able to obtain them.  A related concern was that incumbent firms might use the allowance 
market to construct barriers to entry against new entrants.  To address these issues, approximately three 
percent of the allowances allocated to installations were retained by EPA and auctioned annually, with the 
proceeds (less expenses) returned pro rata to those same installations. But these concerns did not material-
ize, and the allowance auction proved to be largely unnecessary for liquidity purposes.30
Other potential problems with the SO2 market centered on access to information and on transac-
tion costs: Specifically, that information about buyer and seller positions might be difficult to access and 
that transaction costs in the allowance market would be high. Again, these problems did not materialize in 
practice, and the SO2 market supported a robust level of trading activity almost from the outset. By March 
1998, 20.3 million allowances had been traded between unrelated entities and another 1.3 million allow-
ances had been purchased through EPA auctions (Ellerman et al. 2000, 178). The banking provisions in-
cluded in the program helped the market adjust to fluctuations in allowance supply and demand over time.
There is broad consensus that the SO2 allowance market operated transparently and fairly. Accord-
ing to Burtraw and Szambelan (2009, 2), “Transparent data systems, public access to information, and 
strict and certain penalties for noncompliance have led to a virtually perfect compliance record.”  And evi-
dence suggests that both traders and EPA auctions played valuable roles in the price discovery process dur-
ing the early years of the SO2 allowance-trading system (Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 1998, 676–678).
Excessive price volatility would be an indicator of potential problems in the allowance market, 
particularly if volatility were driven by trading behavior rather than by changes in market fundamentals. 
In general, participants at the workshop agreed that SO2 allowance prices had tracked the fundamentals 
in the market, but there was some discussion about what can be considered a “fundamental” in a market 
that is created by regulation. For example, it is unclear if expectations of a future policy change should be 
considered a “fundamental” in the SO2 emissions-trading market.
30   The CAAA also included a provision that allowed firms to purchase SO2 allowances directly from the government at a fixed price of $1,500 per ton. 
However, SO2 allowance markets functioned well and allowance prices remained at or below $200 per ton through 2003—well below prices anticipated 
prior to implementation of the program. The direct sale provision was nullified in 1997 because it was deemed unnecessary.  On this, see: www.epa.gov/
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A major source of uncertainty with any government-created market is that the government can 
undo what it created—possibly unintentionally. In essence, this is what has transpired in the SO2 allow-
ance market.  It was recognized by the late 1990s that SO2 reductions in excess of those resulting from 
Title IV would be required by other provisions in the Clean Air Act and would otherwise be warranted 
in any case, given the significant adverse health effects of fine particulates associated with SO2 emissions. 
Questions remained about how to accomplish these additional reductions.  In 2005, after Congress failed 
to pass President George W. Bush’s Clear Skies Act of 2002,31 which would have tightened the SO2 cap, the 
Administration promulgated CAIR with the same intentions. CAIR lowered the cap on SO2 emissions—
in part by applying more stringent emission requirements on certain “upwind [primarily midwestern] 
states that were contributing to violations of EPA’s primary ambient air quality standards for fine particu-
lates in the eastern United States.” (Palmer and Evans 2009) CAIR attempted to do so while maintaining 
the nation-wide, cap-and-trade system (and the allowances) established under Title IV.
SO2 (Title IV) allowance prices rose in anticipation of CAIR (which one would expect if the cap 
were to be lowered).  Thereafter, an array of factors led to much greater volatility—and reduced liquid-
ity—in the SO2 allowance market. Among these factors were natural disasters (including Hurricanes Ka-
trina and Rita, which impaired petroleum refining capacity) and developments in broader energy markets. 
Importantly, in 2008, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that CAAA Title IV SO2 allowances could 
not be limited on the basis of facility location to address the other Clean-Air-Act requirements (ambient 
air standards) in question (U.S. EPA 2011). Neither the Bush nor the Barack Obama Administrations 
appealed that decision, and congressional attempts to affirm the reduction in the cap (which industry had 
already begun implementing) were unsuccessful. In response to the court’s 2008 decision on CAIR, the 
Bush and Obama Administrations developed new rules to replace CAIR that employ trading only within 
states and do not employ Title IV allowances; the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) was finalized 
in July 2011.32 Subsequently, SO2 (Title IV) allowance prices fell to near zero (Burtraw and Szambelan 
2009).33
In sum, the recent history of SO2 regulation is complex—and that is the point. The allowance-
trading system was highly successful in its first decade of operation, in terms of both aggregate cost and 
environmental effectiveness—and showed every sign of continuing to be so. However, conflicts arose be-
tween market-based and traditional regulatory methods, as well as between objectives specified in law and 
regulation. While the Title IV allowance market itself functioned transparently, effectively, and with great 
31   www.epa.gov/clearskies
32   www.epa.gov/airtransport
33   See also Belden (2005); Bravender (2009); Palmer and Evans (2009); Schmalensee and Stavins (2011, 4–5); Spinney (2011); U.S. EPA (2011). For 
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integrity, the broader regulatory environment for this market—to the chagrin of almost all stakeholders—
served to end its life prematurely.
6. Distribution of Allowances and Fairness of Impact
A program that is seen as unfair or inequitable in its distribution of benefits and costs can have 
difficulty winning political support.  Three distributional issues are particularly relevant to the SO2 allow-
ance-trading system: (1) the method by which emissions allowances were allocated; (2) the geographic 
distribution of program benefits and costs; and (3) the distribution of benefits and costs across socio-
economic groups.
Allowance Allocation
To a close approximation, regulated entities in a cap-and-trade system will face the same incentives 
to reduce emissions, regardless of how allowances are initially allocated, including, specifically, how many 
allowances a given firm holds at the outset (Montgomery 1972).  What matters with regard to firms’ deci-
sions to trade or abate are marginal abatement costs, and these costs are generally unaffected by the initial 
allocation of allowances.34
Emissions allowances have monetary value as a result of the aggregate cap placed on emissions, 
combined with the system’s enforcement mechanisms. Government, in effect, is creating a new commod-
ity (that is, a new property right in limited supply, in place of a previously unlimited open-access resource) 
and must decide at the outset how to transfer that commodity to the private entities that will need it to 
demonstrate compliance. As discussed above, the government has two basic options: Allowances can be 
given away or sold (preferably through an auction, which will facilitate smooth functioning of the market).
The intent of the Acid Rain Program was to cut permitted emissions in half.  To achieve this goal, 
emitters were expected to incur billions of dollars per year in new compliance costs. Congress and the 
George H.W. Bush Administration judged that it was politically untenable to double the cost of the legis-
lation by requiring SO2 emitters to pay the government for the emissions they were still allowed under the 
new policy. In particular, the free allocation of allowances was critical for gaining the support, or at least 
the acquiescence, of the expected “losers” in the SO2 allowance-trading program—that is, high-sulfur-coal-
intensive power companies in the Midwest and their congressional representatives.
34   For an examination of the conditions under which this theorem of the independence of the initial allocation from the equilibrium allocation after trading 
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Free allowances represent a cash transfer to firms and so can be used to compensate firms that face 
particularly high costs, without changing the cap or distorting the market incentives of the program that 
lead to a cost-effective solution.  Although free allowances can, under some circumstances, constitute a sig-
nificant windfall, the option to freely allocate some or all allowances nonetheless provides an opportunity 
to build political support for a nascent cap-and-trade program.  Conversely, an auction forces emitters to 
pay for permitted emissions for which they have previously not had to pay.35
Indeed, members of Congress fought intensely to increase the share of freely allocated allowances 
that would go to utilities in their home districts, as a means to sell the SO2 allowance-trading program 
to constituents.36 In the end, the distribution of free allowances to individual firms was largely based on 
prior regulatory benchmarks associated with emissions per unit of heat. This general principle allowed for 
considerable political horse-trading at the margin, however—that is, awarding a few more allowances to 
a particular plant in a particular district while maintaining the total cap—to win support for the overall 
policy.37
At the time the CAAA were being debated, consumer advocates, economists, and environmen-
tal organizations exerted little pressure to consider alternatives to free allocation, the most significant of 
which is an auction that would raise public revenues.  Economic analyses conducted since that time have 
elucidated the relative merits of free allocation and auctions, with regard to distributional issues and cost-
effectiveness.  Three conclusions are relevant to the SO2 allowance-trading program:
1.  Unless the overall emissions cap is very stringent, the sum of the market value of allowances is likely 
to substantially exceed the total abatement costs incurred to meet the cap.  Thus, recipients of free al-
lowances are likely to be overcompensated for their actual compliance costs, resulting in a windfall.38 
35   As noted above, EPA each year withheld a small number of allowances (2.8 percent of the total) to sell through a spot auction.  This provision was origi-
nally introduced to ensure that new entrants could obtain the allowances they needed to operate, and in the early years it may have provided valuable 
information on future allowance prices. The first spot auction was held in 1993, two years before Phase I went into effect. This auction indicated that 
allowance prices were likely to be lower than the industry had predicted. This information led several companies to cancel orders for expensive scrubber 
systems. See also Ellerman, et al. (2000, 175).
36   For detailed quantitative analyses of the political economy of the congressional process that determined allocation methods, see Joskow and Schmalensee 
(1998) and Ellerman et al. (2000, 31–76).
37   An important adjustment that was made for political purposes was to allow utilities to select the average annual fuel consumption of a plant in the years 
1985-1987, to account for those power plants that were operating at less than capacity or were inoperative for maintenance for all or a portion of the 
year 1985. 
38   The magnitude of the windfall to emitters could be even more significant in the context of a much larger market for greenhouse-gas allowances. The 
experience of the European Union Emissions Trading System provides some evidence for this windfall effect. An approach that would fully compensate 
emitters (on average, across all sectors) in a U.S. economy-wide CO2 cap-and-trade system would initially auction 50 perecent of the allowances and 
move gradually to a 100 percent auction over 25 years.  This would be roughly equivalent to a 15 percent free allocation in perpetuity (Stavins 2008).20 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
2.  In competitive markets, free allocation does not reduce firms’ incentives to pass the marginal cost of emis-
sions control (as reflected in the market price of allowances) through to customers.  Again, this is because 
the cost to a firm of using an allowance is the same whether the firm already holds the allowance (in which 
case it is foregoing the opportunity to sell that allowance at the market price) or has to purchase the allow-
ance.  This means that a large share of the costs of a cap-and-trade program can be expected to ultimately 
be borne by consumers.  In effect, free allowances amount to a transfer of wealth from consumers to the 
shareholders of the firms holding the free allowances. However, under cost-of-service regulation of electric-
utility companies, which is still in place in many states, regulators are unlikely to allow firms to pass through 
the market price of allowances if those allowances have been received for free. In these cases, free allocation 
will lead to lower electricity prices.  This will create significant differences in effects in different regions of 
the country, based on whether markets are competitive or regulated.
3.  An allowance auction generates public revenues that can be used to reduce distortionary taxes in the econ-
omy (especially taxes on income or investment).39  In this way, an auction can improve overall economic 
efficiency and reduce costs to society, even though the private costs incurred for pollution abatement under 
the policy remain unchanged.
Regional Distribution of SO2 Program Costs and Benefits
  Most of the nation’s coal-fired, electric-generating capacity is concentrated east of the Mississippi 
River, and much of that capacity was built more than a generation ago.40 Plants in the West tend to be 
newer.  Air pollutants emitted from the tall smokestacks of older plants are transported long distances 
in the lower atmosphere, causing environmental harm hundreds and even thousands of miles from their 
sources.41 Because of prevailing west to east wind patterns, much of the pollution emitted by large coal 
plants in the upper Midwest and Ohio River Valley is carried to the northeastern and mid-Atlantic states 
(as well as eastern Canada).  Thus, it was reasonable to expect that most of the cost of SO2 controls would 
be concentrated in the midwestern states, while most of the benefits would accrue to northeastern states.
However, from the beginning, there were concerns that a cap-and-trade system could not guaran-
tee that emissions reductions would occur in the quantities and at the locations needed to protect all areas 
from environmental harm. Indeed, the advantage of cap and trade is that it directs abatement to where it 
39   This is an application of a more general principle that society would often benefit from shifting the burden of taxation from social “goods” (primarily 
investment or income) to social “bads” (such as pollution).
40   In aggregate, coal-fired capacity in the United States (approximately 330 gigawatts in 2000) had an average age of 35 years in 2002 (Deutch, Moniz, et 
al. 2007, 17–18).
41   The tall stacks employed by coal-fired power plants were themselves a response to earlier Clean Air Act regulations that governed ambient concentrations 
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is least costly, not necessarily to facilities causing the most geographic-specific damage. Northeastern states 
worried that the ability to buy allowances in lieu of installing SO2 controls might leave upwind sources 
too much latitude to avoid making the actual emissions reductions needed to address downwind impacts.
New York and North Carolina, among other eastern states, implemented their own regulations to 
direct abatement to where it would produce the most benefits for their residents. New York, in particular, 
conducted a lengthy legal campaign to maintain its more stringent standards (Palmer, Burtraw, and Shih 
2005; Stavins 2003, 28–29; Winebrake, Farrell, and Bernstein 1995, 244–246). These actions highlight 
something of a tension between geographically broad-based, cap-and-trade approaches and state and local 
authorities’ desires to limit emissions within a particular area or from a particular set of sources.  As sug-
gested in the discussion of regulatory complexity above, extending the allowance-trading program over the 
largest geographically-relevant area and minimizing (or eliminating) overlapping regulatory requirements 
was key to realizing its potential to be cost-effective.  On the other hand, any source that might be com-
pelled by state or local regulations to implement extra pollution controls would end up with extra allow-
ances under the federal program that could then be sold to other sources in a different jurisdiction.42  The 
end result would be no net change in total emissions over the larger region covered by the cap.
Distributional concerns also arose with respect to impacts on electricity rates. To the extent that 
midwestern utilities implemented the largest share of SO2 reductions, they (and their ratepayers) also in-
curred the largest share of SO2 control costs.  Nevertheless, the SO2 allowance-trading system on the whole 
did not produce substantial rate differentials across regions, in part because overall compliance costs ended 
up being quite low, but also because coal hardly ever sets the electricity price in competitive markets.  As 
a result, the effect of the program on marginal electricity prices was small.  This was true despite it being 
common in regulated electricity markets for state regulators, legislators, or both to adopt policies that dis-
couraged the pursuit of least-cost compliance options.
For example, a number of states tried to direct in-state utilities toward using in-state coal or install-
ing scrubbers so they could continue using in-state, high-sulfur coal rather than taking advantage of lower 
cost fuel-switching options from out-of-state sources.  Such state policies were struck down by the courts as 
interference with interstate commerce.  These types of policies would have made the national SO2 trading 
program more costly. Nonetheless, the rate impacts were still small, particularly since electricity rates in 
the regulated, coal-intensive areas of the Midwest were generally quite low to begin with (and considerably 
lower than rates in the downwind northeastern states).
42   For a discussion of parallel concerns about the interaction of federal and state regulations, pertaining to greenhouse gases, see Goulder and Stavins 
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The acid rain experience and subsequent debates about the use of cap and trade in other contexts 
suggest that issues of geographically-specific impacts and state and local control should be considered 
in light of the type of pollutant being regulated, its behavior in the environment, and the specific harm 
being addressed.  For some pollution problems, particularly those characterized by well-defined relation-
ships between sources and points of damage (receptors) combined with increasing marginal receptor dam-
ages, cap and trade (or other flexible, market-based mechanisms) can lead to problematic “hot-spots”—or 
geographically-concentrated damage—which increase total damages and hence may not be appropriate.   
By contrast, in the case of climate change, the location of the emissions source has no bearing whatsoever 
on its environmental impact: GHGs are evenly distributed throughout the global atmosphere, thus emis-
sions from any given source have the same warming effect on the atmosphere as GHGs emitted anywhere 
else.  From this perspective, cap and trade and other market-based approaches are especially well suited to 
limiting GHG emissions.
On the spectrum from pollutants with primarily local impacts to pollutants with entirely global 
impacts, SO2 falls in the middle: Because of its transport and deposition properties, emissions impacts may 
be dispersed over a very broad region; at the same time there was some heterogeneity in the distribution 
of benefits across the nation.  Concerns about local impacts or potential hot-spots were to some extent 
alleviated by the existence of separate regulatory protections in the form of federally-mandated ambient 
air quality standards for SO2.43 In addition, modeling analyses undertaken prior to passage of the 1990 
CAAA pointed to the likelihood that the distribution of actual emission cuts would be highly correlated 
geographically with the distribution of the largest and most damaging emissions sources. Thus, policy 
makers could be reasonably confident that a single national SO2 market would drive substantial emissions 
reductions in the Midwest, where the largest coal plants were concentrated. This confidence was largely 
borne out as the program was implemented (Ellerman et al. 2000, 77–80; Swift 2004, 7–8).44
As discussed above, provisions in the Clean Air Act concerning ambient air standards led the EPA 
under the George W. Bush Administration to develop CAIR, which attempted to reconcile geography-
specific remedies with national allowance trading. The courts determined that this attempt was inconsis-
tent with the Clean Air Act and vacated CAIR. The replacement for CAIR, the Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rule (CSAPR, initially known as the Clean Air Transport Rule), addresses the concerns of the courts, but 
43   Near the opposite end of the spectrum from GHGs, the EPA under the George W. Bush Administration attempted to implement a trading system related 
to its Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), which was intended to reduce mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants. Mercury is not transported far 
from its source, and concern about hot-spots was one factor (among several) in CAMR not being implemented.
44   Perhaps further vindicating this approach, later efforts to address acid rain in Europe through smaller, regional cap-and-trade programs illustrated the 
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in so doing, effectively eliminated national (interstate) allowance trading45 in favor of more geographically-
restricted trading intended to focus the health benefits of emissions reductions on specific downwind 
states. This will reduce cost-effectiveness in favor of what is intended to be a more equitable distribution 
of benefits across geographical regions (Belden 2005; Nelson 2011; Schmalensee and Stavins 2011; U.S. 
EPA 2011).
Distribution Across Socio-Economic Groups
  Any public policy raises concerns about how the benefits and costs of that policy are distributed 
across socio-economic groups. As suggested in the foregoing section, the possibility that a facility chooses 
to purchase allowances rather than reduce emissions could result, under certain conditions, in decreased 
local air quality.  In their study of the SO2 allowance-trading system, Shadbegian, Gray, and Morgan 
(2005) found that low-income groups received slightly lower benefits than people of higher income, but 
that minority groups received significantly greater benefits, relative to cost, than the average population. 
It is likely that this was because minorities are concentrated in cities, where the local health benefits of 
reduced SO2 concentrations dominate the benefit-cost analysis.
  Evidence indicates that the SO2 allowance-trading system did not lead to significant hot-spots.  A 
number of explanations for this result were offered at the workshop.   One explanation is that local and 
state regulations—including those intended to achieve compliance with National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards—tended to preclude hot-spots; another is that trading in conjunction with a significant overall 
reduction in emissions (via the cap) tended to lead to reductions at the largest-emitting facilities and to 
smoothing out emissions over space, rather than concentrating them (Swift 2004).
7. Technological Innovation
Advances in technology can expand the menu of abatement options available and substantially 
reduce the cost of achieving emissions reductions.  In choosing among different policy instruments, it is 
important to consider whether some options are more effective at inducing technology innovation than 
others (or at least pose fewer impediments to innovation).
On its face, a market-based approach would seem to have advantages over a command-and-con-
trol-based approach for at least two reasons: First, the greater flexibility of a market-based approach pro-
vides greater latitude for regulated entities to pursue compliance strategies that might not have been an-
45   Previously allowed by the same Court in 2000 when ruling on the NOx Budget Trading Program (U.S. EPA, National Center for Environmental Eco-
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ticipated by policy makers at the outset of the program.  Second, while a command-and-control system 
can create incentives for reducing the costs associated with achieving a given environmental standard, it 
does not provide incentives for out-performing the standard (or “over-complying,” as discussed above).46  
A market-based program, by contrast, creates continuous incentives for innovation, since each additional 
ton of reduction that can be achieved for less than the market price of an allowance creates value for the 
entity that produces those reductions. In looking at these issues from the standpoint of real-world experi-
ence with the SO2 allowance-trading system, workshop participants considered the record of innovation 
in two areas: with respect to improvements in scrubber technologies and with respect to the diffusion of a 
broader set of emissions-reducing practices unrelated to the use of any particular technology.
Scrubbers—as noted, by far the prevalent technology for removing SO2 from power-plant emis-
sions—were an established technology in 1990. Environmental regulation under the 1970 Clean Air Act 
had made the use of scrubbers an important compliance option in newly-built coal-fired power plants 
(Lange and Bellas 2005).  The 1970 legislation had specified an emissions rate that could be met through 
use of low-sulfur coals found in the East and West, but in response to the 1977 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, regulations were tightened to require a 70–90 percent removal of SO2 from the emissions of un-
controlled coal.  This could only be accomplished through the use of scrubbers. The 1977 bill also required 
a 90 percent reduction of emissions from new sources relative to the emissions levels that would prevail 
without mandated control. This further encouraged the use of scrubbers.
More than half of currently installed SO2 scrubber systems were installed after the 1990 CAAA, 
but the timing of more recent installations has come in bursts.  From 1990 through 2000, scrubbers were 
installed at a nearly constant rate; installations slowed early in Phase II of the Acid Rain Program (after 
2000), however, as growth in electric-sector demand slowed and as utilities used banked allowances from 
Phase I to meet their compliance obligations.  For utilities subject to Title IV requirements after the pas-
sage of the CAAA in 1990, the decision to install scrubber systems involved multiple considerations: the 
strength of the price signal for SO2 reductions (as reflected in the market price of SO2 allowances); the cost 
and feasibility of other abatement options (such as fuel switching); investment risk (including uncertainty 
about future allowance prices and about the susceptibility of SO2 markets to price volatility); cost recovery 
rules (in the case of regulated utilities); and the effects of state-level (Frey 2008) or other federal regulatory 
and financial incentives.47
46   Under certain conditions, a command-and-control system might even create disincentives to further improving on available control technologies—par-
ticularly if regulated entities view these improvements as opening the door to ever more stringent pollution control requirements.
47   One workshop participant pointed out that utilities likely considered another advantage of scrubbers: These systems generally can be shut down or by-
passed to increase output during periods of high electricity prices and demand.  To compensate for excess emissions released during these periods, utilities 
can purchase allowances or operate at a more stringent level of emissions control during periods of lower demand.HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM  •  HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL  »  25
The wave of scrubber installations (technology diffusion) that occurred in the 1990s was attribut-
able in large part to the incentives created by the SO2 cap-and-trade program, since the high cost of these 
systems could only be justified in expectation of non-trivial SO2 allowance prices.  Some evidence also sug-
gests that the program succeeded at inducing innovation in scrubber technology.  Scrubber performance 
has improved over the last two decades, and the costs of achieving a fixed level of scrubber performance 
have declined (Bellas and Lange 2011; Popp 2003; Lange and Bellas 2005; Burtraw 2000; Burtraw and 
Palmer 2003, 22–24).48
The SO2 allowance-trading program also appears to have sparked innovation in a range of compli-
ance alternatives that could reduce SO2 emissions without necessitating the use of add-on pollution con-
trols.  One example was the diffusion of mining techniques for extracting lower-sulfur coal seams, a prac-
tice that was known before the 1990 CAAA but not in wide use. A related strategy deployed in the 1990s 
involved blending low-sulfur coal with high-sulfur coal to reduce the aggregate sulfur-intensity of boiler 
fuel. Prior to 1990, many in the industry believed that existing boilers could accommodate only modest 
levels of fuel blending unless modifications were made that required large capital investments.  After the 
cap-and-trade program went into effect, this view was disproved, with some plants achieving blend levels 
of as much as 40 percent without significant modifications. Clearly, fuel switching would not have evolved 
to become a significant compliance option had the government pursued a more prescriptive regulatory 
policy that required all emissions sources to install add-on controls.
The SO2 allowance-trading program also stimulated non-technological innovations in the electric 
utility industry.  These included strategies for managing allowance trading within a firm and creating the 
appropriate financial management and brokerage capacities needed to exploit new market opportunities.   
More generally, the cap-and-trade system, by its nature, granted the flexibility of a performance (as op-
posed to a technology) standard on individual sources, and then allowed trading.  In other words, even 
without trading, the cap-and-trade system was less costly than an inflexible technology standard would 
have been.  Workshop participants characterized this as facilitating “cost savings without trading” (Burtraw 
1996).  Along with improvements in SO2 control technologies, these examples of innovation and knowl-
edge diffusion played some role in reducing overall Acid-Rain-Program costs and were seen by workshop 
participants as strengthening the innovation case for favoring market-based environmental regulation.
48   Some cost reduction was probably the result of learning through using, as the number of installed scrubbers increased. Also, a market emerged for much 
cheaper scrubbers that were somewhat less reliable than New Source Performance Standards allowed, which lowered average cost.  26 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
8. Political Context of the Acid Rain Program
In July 1989, President George H.W. Bush proposed substantial revisions to the Clean Air Act, 
based in part on earlier congressional proposals and in part on new ideas developed by his Administration. 
The final bill containing the CAAA of 1990 passed the House of Representatives by nearly a 20 to 1 mar-
gin (401-21) and the Senate by a large majority (89-11). A joint conference committee met from July to 
October of 1990 to resolve differences in the House and Senate bills, and both houses approved the pack-
age recommended by the conferees with almost identical majorities.49 The President signed the resulting 
bill into law on November 15, 1990.  The Amendments contained seven titles, each of which substantially 
updated an existing portion of the Clean Air Act. In addition to the acid rain title (IV), these included 
programs related to urban smog, industrial emissions of certain toxic chemicals, automobile emissions, 
and releases of chemicals that deplete ozone in the upper atmosphere.50 
Unlike most earlier pieces of landmark environmental legislation, the CAAA of 1990 was not 
precipitated by a “crisis moment,” which may have given policy makers greater latitude to implement a 
flexible and entrepreneurial policy, rather than resorting to a more rigid traditional approach (Wiener and 
Richman 2010). On the other hand, some workshop participants did point out that concern about the 
environment was rising generally in the summer of 1988, with unusually hot weather contributing to poor 
air quality (as evidenced by a high level of ambient ozone—smog—that summer), and with many reports 
of ocean pollution in New York and New Jersey.
Some workshop participants asserted that the Acid Rain Program flew “under the radar,” in terms 
of the attention it received both from the public and environmental advocacy groups—perhaps because 
they were more concerned about changes to other portions of the Act or perhaps because the issue had 
been debated for more than ten years, and the levels of control were consistent with what environmental 
groups had advocated.  These factors allowed for a more calm and deliberative debate about the choice of 
policy instruments than might have been possible under other circumstances. The Bush Administration, 
the Congress, and policy entrepreneurs were important in these developments and helped facilitate the 
adoption of the national SO2 trading program as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.51
49   See legislative chronology at www.epa.gov/ttn/caaa/gen/chron.txt.
50   For a summary of the amendments, see:  http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa_overview.html; For the text of Title IV, see:  http://epa.gov/oar/caa/title4.html.
51   For an account of the political and policy process, see Conniff (2009), and for a concise account of the individuals who contributed to the development 
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The Bush Administration
The administration of President Ronald Reagan had been unfavorably inclined to address public-
policy problems—including environmental challenges—through regulation. This approach had served 
Reagan well, on balance, with regard to public opinion about his stewardship of the economy.  But it began 
to present potential political costs for the subsequent Republican presidential candidate, as environmental 
issues became increasingly important for key demographic groups in swing states with large suburban 
populations leading up to the 1988 election. 
In 1988, Vice President George H.W. Bush made the environment a key theme of his presidential 
campaign, explicitly promising to update the Clean Air Act and to cut acid rain by half. On February 9, 
1989, three weeks after taking office, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and said of 
acid rain that “the time for study alone has passed, and the time for action is now.”52 Five months later, 
his administration submitted to Congress a single, comprehensive clean air bill, which included the basic 
structure of the SO2 allowance-trading program.
Given the confluence of President Bush’s ideological preferences and his campaign commitment to 
reducing SO2 emissions, it was perhaps not surprising that his administration put forward a market-based 
approach to SO2 regulation. The Reagan Administration had deregulated many key sectors of the U.S. 
economy, including airlines, oil and refined oil products, and trucking.53 The limits of a command-and-
control-style approach to governing had become readily apparent with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
With the economic growth of the 1980s beginning to slow, President Bush was concerned about the eco-
nomic impact of the bill. He wanted to improve air quality at the minimum possible cost to industry and 
the economy as a whole and believed that a market-based approach could accomplish this.54
52   http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3420
53   However, the Staggers Rail Act, which deregulated railroads and made low-sulfur, Powder River Basin coal more competitive (see above), was passed 
under President Jimmy Carter in 1980.
54   While workshop participants acknowledged the Bush Administration for its leadership in the legislative process, participants also noted that Bush never 
received sufficient credit for the CAAA from the environmental community or the press.  They were struck by President Bush, despite having launched 
a number of exceptionally important environmental initiatives, failing to win a single endorsement from an environmental advocacy group in his 1992 
reelection bid, opposing Bill Clinton, the Governor of Arkansas, a state then ranked 50th in terms of environmental protection.  (Besides the 1990 
CAAA, the Bush Administration also funded sewage treatment plants around the country, created 57 new wildlife refuges, designated more than a mil-
lion acres of new national park land, and included the United States as a signatory to the Rio Convention on Climate Change.) Some of the participants 
at the workshop who had served in the Bush White House believed that this lack of recognition was a major factor in the Republican Party’s subsequently 
giving up on the environmental vote, concluding Republicans would never win support from environmental interest groups no matter what policies they 
pursued.  Others believed that the negative messages on the environment sent during the eight years of the Reagan Administration and the last two years 
of the Bush Administration, through the actions of the Council on Competiveness to delay and dilute implementation of the CAAA and other laws, had 
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Congress
Bush came into office confronting large Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. Thus, 
all involved knew that legislation could not be enacted without considerable bipartisan support. Congress 
was, on balance, already strongly inclined toward strengthening air quality protections. The Senate Com-
mittee on Environment and Public Works had promoted acid-rain legislation for a decade, but it had 
never gone anywhere, in part because the Majority Leader of the Senate, Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia), 
represented a state with a high reliance on the mining of (high-sulfur) coal, and in part because the Com-
mittee had a history of reporting legislation not sufficiently centrist to attract filibuster-proof majorities in 
the Senate.  But, in November 1988, George Mitchell (D-Maine) was elected Majority Leader, replacing 
Byrd; Maine was among the states most affected by acid rain.
While Mitchell enjoyed a Democratic majority in the Senate, his coalition was not sufficient to 
guarantee the 60 votes necessary to invoke cloture in the event of a filibuster against acid rain legislation, 
especially given disparate regional views within the Democratic Party itself.  Thus, the new Majority 
Leader knew he had to negotiate with the new Bush Administration in order to secure enough votes to 
steer clean air legislation to passage in the Senate.  In this way, both George H.W. Bush (because of his 
campaign promise and his concern about the economy) and George Mitchell (because of his need for a 60 
vote majority) were motivated to negotiate with each other to win passage of a clean air bill acceptable to 
both parties.  Observers at the time, and in the period since, have attributed passage of the CAAA in 1990 
to leadership by “the two Georges.”
The seminal moment in the debate came when President Bush sent a letter to the Majority Leader 
indicating that any clean air bill he would sign would have to meet “five tests of balance and reasonable-
ness,” the most important of which was that its compliance costs could not exceed $20 billion annually 
(plus or minus 5 percent).  This led to a protracted negotiation between representatives of the Adminis-
tration and members of the Senate, led by Senator Mitchell, to craft a bill that could achieve the desired 
environmental outcomes and pass those tests.  After months of negotiation, the Administration and the 
Senate leadership announced an agreement that withstood challenge from both the political left and the 
political right on the Senate floor and led to passage of the CAAA in the Senate by the above-noted margin 
of 89-10, with an equal number of Republicans and Democrats voting against.
In the House, the range of competing interests involved in the acid rain debate was well represent-
ed in the Committee on Energy and Commerce, which included representatives from eastern (high-sulfur) 
coal-producing and coal-using states, several of the northeastern states that were most affected by acid rain, 
and several western low-sulfur coal-producing and -using states. The politics of the electric power industry HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM  •  HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL  »  29
was divided more along regional lines than along party or ideological lines, with coal-intensive districts 
in the Midwest concerned about stranded capital investments and districts in the West apprehensive of 
applying differential regulatory treatment to new and existing capital. On the broader topic of clean air, 
the Committee also represented a wide range of interests, even within parties.  The diversity of views was 
best represented in the long-standing tension between the Chairman of the Committee, Rep. John Dingell 
(D-Michigan), who represented areas of Michigan in which the automobile industry was an important 
employer, and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Rep. Henry Waxman 
(D-California), whose Los Angeles district suffered from the worst smog in the country. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, representatives from the northeastern states and environmental advocates 
had put forth a steady stream of acid rain bills. But the coalitions needed to pass these bills had never 
been able to overcome the fault lines that formed on the basis of regional differences in mitigation costs. 
According to one workshop participant, members of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power (the 
subcommittee with initial jurisdiction over the SO2 trading proposal) were not reflexively opposed to en-
vironmental regulation as such, but were genuinely concerned about the impact of higher electricity rates 
in their districts. These representatives were in principle open to reducing SO2 emissions as long as they 
could be confident that their constituents would receive a “fair” deal.
Policy Entrepreneurs
The proposal for what became the SO2 allowance-trading system was part of a legislative package 
developed by the George H. W. Bush White House.  But where did the White House get its ideas, and 
how did it develop them?  In addition to elected officials, the environmental and academic communities 
played key roles.  In 1960, University of Chicago Professor Ronald Coase laid the intellectual foundation 
in the Journal of Law and Economics (Coase 1960) for the notion of using markets to solve environmental 
problems.  Then, U.S. economist Thomas Crocker (1966) and Canadian economist John Dales (1968) fol-
lowed up by arguing that the best way to clean up air and water pollution would be with a market in rights 
to emit pollution.  These arguments were made much more rigorous a few years later when David Mont-
gomery—a workshop participant—demonstrated in the Journal of Economic Theory (Montgomery 1972) 
precisely how and why an emissions-trading system would be cost-effective.  Prominent legal scholars also 
advocated emissions trading (Ackerman and Stewart 1985).  These and other explorations in the academic 
world eventually led EPA to experiment with small-scale emissions-credit-trading systems in the 1970s 
and 1980s, including most importantly the phase out of leaded gasoline in vehicle fuel in the mid-1980s.30 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
The design and implementation of a much larger-scale allowance-trading program required the 
participation of committed policy entrepreneurs. George H.W. Bush, as already noted, was one. Several of 
those later involved in the Bush Administration played key roles in formulating President Bush’s campaign 
commitments on the environment.  Robert Grady (a workshop participant), chief speechwriter and senior 
policy adviser on the 1988 campaign, joined the White House staff as Associate Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget in charge of Natural Resources, Energy, and Science.  Robert Zoellick, issues 
director on the campaign, became Under Secretary of State and later White House Deputy Chief of Staff.     
C. Boyden Gray (a workshop participant), who had advised Vice President Bush earlier on the White 
House Competitiveness Council that oversaw the phase out of lead in gasoline, became White House 
Counsel. 
Ironically, in light of the political dynamics of the recent climate debate, the main opposition 
to market-based environmental policies at the time came from environmental advocacy groups (with 
an important exception highlighted below) and from Democrats (with a few important exceptions, also 
highlighted below).  Some of these advocates thought that a policy based on the principle that firms could 
“pay to pollute” was morally bankrupt; they worried that the very creation of tradable allowances implied 
that firms had a right or an entitlement to emit.  In their view, the government should continue to regulate 
private-sector emissions through command-and-control regulation, in effect setting minimum control 
standards or technology requirements for each individual emissions source.
Among the major environmental advocacy groups, it was the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
that set itself apart from its environmental brethren by backing market-based approaches to environmental 
protection, including for acid rain control. EDF was led then (as now) by Fred Krupp, another workshop 
participant. When EDF helped the Bush Administration design, and later announced its support of, the 
trading component of the CAAA, it was a “Nixon-in-China” moment and a turning point in the politics 
of market-based regulation. Several workshop participants from the Bush White House confirmed that the 
SO2 trading program could not have won congressional support had EDF not provided the administration 
with the necessary credibility from within the environmental community.
Two policy entrepreneurs in the U.S. Senate, Timothy Wirth (D-Colorado, now President of the 
United Nations Foundation) and the late John Heinz (R-Pennsylvania), together created and chaired Proj-
ect 88, which developed a compelling economic proposal for a market-based program to reduce SO2 emis-
sions through a cap-and-trade system (Stavins, 1988).55  In 1988, shortly after the election and even before 
inauguration, C. Boyden Gray brought the director of the Heinz-Wirth Project 88 effort, Robert Stavins 
55   See also the Heinz Family Philanthropies’ web page for Project 88: www.heinzfamily.org/aboutus/project88.html.HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS PROGRAM  •  HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL  »  31
(then a new assistant professor at the Harvard Kennedy School), to the White House, together with Fred 
Krupp and key members of the EDF staff.  Gray also recruited emissions-trading advocate Richard Stew-
art, a law professor at Harvard, to serve as the top environmental lawyer at the Justice Department.
The development, adoption, and implementation of the Acid Rain Program—as any major in-
novation in public policy—can be attributed to a solid base of knowledge, sound strategy, and a certain 
amount of luck in placing effective policy entrepreneurs in important positions, in this case at the White 
House, EPA, the Department of Justice, the Congress, and environmental organizations.56  These entre-
preneurs, working together on the Acid Rain Program, made a break with the past with regard to environ-
mental policy.
9.  Conclusion
More than twenty years later, the introduction of the national SO2 allowance-trading program as 
part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 remains widely regarded as a landmark step in the world-
wide history of environmental regulation.  The program, while not without flaws, is viewed as a success 
by almost all measures.  Certainly it demonstrated that broad-based cap-and-trade systems can be used to 
achieve significant emissions reductions, that firms can navigate and regulators can enforce the compliance 
requirements of such systems, and that giving the private sector the flexibility to pursue a range of abate-
ment options can simultaneously protect the environment, stimulate innovation and diffusion, and reduce 
aggregate costs. 
The SO2 allowance-trading program was enacted with large bipartisan majorities and was successful 
in reducing SO2 emissions at a cost much less than a traditional-regulatory approach would have incurred 
(and less than had been predicted). The program was partially inspired by the belief that the shortcomings 
of earlier emissions-credit-trading programs could be overcome with a cap-and-trade design and strong 
monitoring.  The program’s subsequent success in turn inspired other market-based emissions-reductions 
programs, including the much larger European Union Emissions Trading System.
56   Other active and influential enthusiasts of market-based environmental instruments were:  In the White House, Deputy Counsel John Schmitz, Domes-
tic Policy Adviser Roger Porter, Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) Member Richard Schmalensee, and CEA Senior Staff Economist Robert Hahn. 
(All except Schmitz were workshop participants.)  At EPA, Administrator William Reilly enjoyed valuable credibility with environmental advocacy 
groups; Deputy Administrator Henry Habicht and Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation William Rosenberg were key, early supporters of 
market-based instruments.  At EDF, in addition to Fred Krupp, Senior Economist Daniel Dudek and Staff Attorney Joseph Goffman worked closely 
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The broad political consensus on the CAAA of 1990 was hard-won. A number of influential stake-
holders engaged in a decade of often contentious deliberation and negotiation—including intense discus-
sion about the Title IV provisions—before Congress passed the Amendments.  Divergent views on the 
CAAA largely reflected regional differences in the distribution of coal-fired power plants and coal types. 
But the advent of the proposed allowance-trading program facilitated the consensus that emerged among 
leaders in the Bush Administration, lawmakers in Congress, and many affected corporations and business 
associations (Joskow and Schmalensee 1998).  Thus, the SO2 allowance-trading program made it possible 
to focus on how one could achieve the agreed public policy goal (in this case, reducing acid rain pollution) 
in a manner that would simultaneously minimize costs and provide regulated entities with the flexibility 
embodied in markets.
The recent climate debate has taken place in a political context that is much different than that of 
the CAAA of 1990.  Deep ideological division dominates today’s dialogue in Washington; the two major 
political parties were much less ideologically polarized in 1990.  A convergence of the creative vision and 
the large bipartisan majorities of 1990 appears much less likely today.  Recent hostility toward cap and 
trade in U.S. climate legislation may reflect the broader political environment of the climate debate more 
than it reflects the substantive merits (or demerits) of market-based regulation.  In other words, congres-
sional hostility toward greenhouse-gas cap and trade appears to have been collateral damage in a wider set 
of policy and ideological battles.
Ironically, the cap-and-trade model seems especially well suited to addressing the problem of cli-
mate change, in that emitted GHGs are evenly distributed throughout the world’s atmosphere.  Emis-
sions reductions anywhere make identical contributions to helping alleviate the problem, and there are 
no pollutant concentration hot-spots. The sheer number and variety of GHG-emissions sources heightens 
the practical difficulty of developing a comprehensive and effective command-and-control approach and 
magnifies the cost savings that could be achieved by enlisting the market to find the least costly abatement 
options.
It is difficult to achieve an international agreement to limit GHG emissions, however, for precisely 
the same reasons—many countries, hosting many emissions sources, must agree to take action. Given the 
complexities of either developing a domestic U.S. cap-and-trade system for GHGs or obtaining congres-
sional approval for an international system in which the United States participates, it is likely that at least 
as much bipartisan collaboration would be required as was evident in the CAAA process. Instead, we have 
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The stakes for a broad-based GHG policy—economic, political, and environmental—are much 
higher than they were for SO2 policy in 1990. While the debate over federal policy to address climate 
change is currently in hiatus, the lessons of the SO2 allowance-trading program will prove useful and rel-
evant to future deliberations about climate change policy when the time arrives for serious reflection.  34 « THE  SO2 ALLOWANCE TRADING SYSTEM AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990: REFLECTIONS ON TWENTY YEARS OF POLICY INNOVATION
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